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"A VIEw FROM THE TRENCHES": THE MILITARY ROLE IN THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
MichaelA. Newtont
Our nation 's cause has always been larger than our
nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a
just peace - a peace that favors human liberty...
Building this just peace is America's opportunity, and
America 's duty.
President George W. Bush'
As a combat arms officer who later went to law school, it is really a
pleasure to focus on the stated topic for this panel because that's what I do.
As a former armor officer, my roots are literally in the trenches. In sharing
my figurative view from the trenches regarding the pursuit of justice, you
should know that the pursuit of justice is the very core of our professional
ethic among military lawyers. I was also privileged to serve as one of the
foot soldiers within the ranks of the Department of State whose diplomatic
focus revolved around the pursuit of personal accountability. My "view
from the trenches" is therefore centered on a candid discussion of the
pragmatic aspects of developing justice systems within the conditions and
confines of military operations.
When focusing on the pursuit of justice, more efforts are necessary to
bridge the gap between the tactical, ground-based, mission-focused
perspective of soldiers and commanders and the more abstract, professional
perspective that lawyers bring to the effort. There is no cookie-cutter
I Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army. Presently assigned to the
Department of Law, United States Military Academy at West Point. Previously served as
the Senior Advisor to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, United States
Department of State. As a member of the United States delegation to the Preparatory
Commission on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court after adoption of the
Rome Statute, Lieutenant Colonel Newton assisted with drafting and negotiating the
Elements of Crimes for each offense required by Article 9 of the Rome Statute. Lieutenant
Colonel Newton may be reached by e-mail at michael.newton@usma.edu. The opinions and
conclusions of this paper, as well as its faults, are solely those of the author. They do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Judge Advocate General, the United States Army, the
United States Department of State, or any other federal entity.
1 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United
States Military Academy (June 1, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
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approach, but this essay will explore some of the concrete lessons learned
and some practicalities inherent in actualizing justice within an operational
environment. At the outset, it is important to realize that military forces
will never deploy with the sole mission statement, "Exercise military power
to facilitate the pursuit of truth-based justice." The corollary to this is that
military efforts to support accountability mechanisms will at most be
merely a component of a much larger, more complex mission.
The transition from justice as an esoteric intellectual aspiration to a
tangible objective that takes form and shape within the context of a military
operation is very difficult. The necessity for a commander to direct every
operation towards a defined, decisive, and attainable objective is derived
from a basic principle of war, and is fundamental to American military
doctrine.2 Depending on the circumstances and the mission objectives,
military actions directed towards truth-based justice may be high profile,
purposeful actions that are deliberately planned and resourced or they may
be an operational afterthought.
For example, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
837 on June 6, 1993 in response to the murders of twenty-five Pakistani
peacekeepers in Somalia. The Security Council invoked its Chapter VII
authority to permit United Nations forces to "take all necessary measures
against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... including to secure
the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for
prosecution, trial and punishment., 3 Based on this clear mission statement,
U.S. forces subsequently began the highly publicized and ultimately
2 The principle of war is objective. Army doctrine captures this principle for
multinational operations as follows:
Commanders must focus significant energy on ensuring that all multinational
operations are directed toward clearly defined and commonly understood
objectives that contribute to the attainment of the desired end state. No two
nations share exactly the same reasons for entering into a coalition or alliance.
Furthermore, each nation's motivation tends to change during the situation.
National goals can be harmonized with an agreed-upon strategy, but often the
words used in expressing goals and objectives intentionally gloss over
differences. Even in the best of circumstances, nations act according to their
own national interests. Differing goals, often unspoken, cause each nation to
measure progress differently. Thus, participating nations must agree to clearly
defined and mutually attainable objectives.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-8: THE ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1-2
(1997).
3 S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993)
(expressing grave alarm at the premeditated attacks apparently directed by the United Somali
Congress).
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unsuccessful campaign to capture the local warlord, Mohammed Farrah
Aidid.4
The apprehension efforts in Somalia stand in sharp contrast to the
initial NATO posture in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1996 and early 1997.
The parties to the General Framework Agreement for Peace accepted the
legal obligation to "cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law." 5 This meant
that the signatories of the treaty (e.g. Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) had the legal mandate to arrest suspects,
along with a range of other responsibilities such as access to witnesses,
provision of evidence, travel of Tribunal officials, etc.6 The North Atlantic
Council subsequently determined that military apprehension of suspects
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) would destabilize the region and undermine overall operational
goals by enhancing the status of the radical nationalist parties. On the
strength of a narrow reading of the Security Council resolution authorizing
NATO operations,7 the North Atlantic Council approved rules of
engagement that permitted military personnel to detain indicted persons
4 Patrick J. Sloyan, Hunting Down Aidid; Why Clinton Changed His Mind, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 6, 1993, at Al.
5 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995,
art. IX 35 I.L.M. 75, 90 [hereinafter GFAP], available at http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-
frm.htm.
6 In light of this legal obligation, the United States Congress conditioned United States
foreign aid to these nations on their cooperation with the work of the Tribunal as early as
1998. See, e.g., Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-115 § 581, 115 Stat. 2118, 2170-71 (2002)
(Known as the Lautenberg amendment, the Act has led to intensive diplomatic and military
efforts just prior to the certification window each year, and has produced positive results on
balance, to include assisting in the FRY decision to transfer Slobodan Milosevic to The
Hague. The key provision follows: "(a)(l) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise
made available pursuant to this Act may be made available for assistance, and the Secretary
of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive directors to the international
financial institutions to vote against any new project involving the extension by such
institutions of any financial or technical assistance, to any country, entity, or municipality
whose competent authorities have failed, as determined by the Secretary of State, to take
necessary and significant steps to implement its international legal obligations to apprehend
and transfer to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the 'Tribunal')
all persons in their territory who have been publicly indicted by the Tribunal and to
otherwise cooperate with the Tribunal. (2) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply
to humanitarian assistance or assistance for democratization.").
7 S.C. Res. 1030, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607th mtg. 14-15, U.S. Doc. S/Res/1031
(1995) (acting under Chapter VII to establish the multinational force to ensure compliance
with the GFAP and to "take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and
ensure compliance with" the military aspects of the GFAP).
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"only if they come into contact with such individuals in the execution of
assigned tasks and the situation permits detention.,
8
Operational experience has shown that although efforts to achieve
justice will rarely, if ever, be the sole military mission, they are often an
integral component of the broader military mission. The phrase "pursuit of
justice" is really nothing more than coded shorthand for the intimate
linkage between justice and liberty that most of us would embrace in the
deepest part of our consciousness as being an innate and enduring truth
worthy of our mutual efforts. In fact, the most dramatic trend in military
operations over the past twenty years has been the expansion of ancillary
tasks other than pure war-fighting such as the effort to nurture, or in some
cases restore, the rule of law.9
The societal rule of law generates the intellectual and bureaucratic
superstructure necessary for justice to become actualized in everyday
practice. The military has the dominant role in establishing the
environment necessary for the rule of law to take root and develop, which
in turn provides the societal stability that permits the military to salute
smartly and declare "mission accomplished, we are going home." In
Bosnia, while the military role in ending the conflict and promoting "an
enduring peace and stability"' was clearly outlined in Annex IA of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina," the
overall success of the mission was linked to the civilian tasks addressed in
annexes 2 through 11 12
8 TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND
COMMAND GUIDANCE HANDBOOK (6th ed. 1998) (on file with author). In sharp contrast,
KFOR arrested three suspected war criminals in coordination with the ICTY barely six
weeks after entering Kosovo based on the clear mandates of Resolution 1244. See infra
notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
9 See generally RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY
FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1999); DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION: WAGING WAR
AND KEEPING PEACE WITH AMERICA'S MILITARY (2003).
10 GFAP, supra note 5, 35 I.L.M. at 89.
11 GFAP, supra note 5, Annex IA, art. VI, para. 2, 35 I.L.M. at 97 (Annex 1A provided
the primary military aspects of the mission: "to monitor and help ensure compliance by all
Parties" with their obligations to withdraw and redeploy Forces within agreed periods, and
establish Zones of Separation; "to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the
Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and
its Zone of Separation as established by the General Framework Agreement; to establish
liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international
organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission; and to assist in the
withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to the IFOR, including, if necessary, the
emergency withdrawal of UNCRO Forces.")
12 GFAP, supra note 5, Annexes 2-11 (The civilian tasks include monitoring elections, the
return of refugees and displaced persons, fostering respect for human rights, and the
establishment of an international police force.).
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Though only obligated to support the civilian functions "within the
limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on
request," the military discovered that its mission accomplishment and the
larger civilian goals were interconnected in a subtle yet powerful way.
13
This perspective helps explain why the Commander of NATO forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (COMIFOR) ordered a team of military lawyers from
France, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to prepare a
comprehensive report assessing the justice system in Bosnia in the early
days of the operation.' 4 Furthermore, in an effort to speed progress towards
achieving the political goals of the operation, NATO shifted its policy
guidance in mid-1997 to actively assist the ICTY in apprehending indicted
war criminals forces found within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In the context of Somalia, President Clinton summarized the role of
the American military in facilitating the restoration of civil stability in his
address to the nation on October 7, 1993 by saying:
And make no mistake about it: If we were to leave Somalia tomorrow,
other nations would leave too. Chaos would resume, the relief effort would
stop, and starvation soon would return. That knowledge has led us to
continue our mission. It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even
to create a political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work
in peace; the Somalis must do that for themselves. The United Nations and
many African states are more than willing to help. But we - we in the
United States - must decide whether we will give them enough time to have
a reasonable chance to succeed. 1
5
From the perspective of an American military professional, the roots of
the intellectual effort to describe the concept of justice are relevant to its
present incarnation as an operational objective. The pursuit of justice in
modem military operations reflects the evolution of a very old
philosophical quest. For the Greeks, the pursuit of justice symbolized a
13 GFAP, supra note 5, Annex IA art. VI, para. 3, 35 I.L.M. at 97 (articulated supporting
tasks are: "to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks
associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; to assist the
movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; to assist the
UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions; to observe and
prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced
persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and, to
monitor the clearing ofminefields and obstacles.").
14 THE OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADvISOR, HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE RAPID
REACTION CORPS, A REPORT ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (Oct. 8,
1996)(copy on file with author).
15 President William J. Clinton, U.S. Military Involvement in Somalia, Washington, D.C.,
Address to the Nation, (Oct. 7, 1993), reprinted in 4 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, No. 42, 1
(Oct. 18, 1993), available at
http://gopher.state.gov/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no42.html.
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quest for order and harmony. 16 Plato conceived of justice as "the highest
order of things" on both the personal and societal level.' 7 The principle of
justice embodies the proper balance of power, wisdom, and temperance
which in turn generates societal and personal stability. Growing out of this
philosophical framework, the need for justice and an end to repression have
been a major demand of the population even during operations in areas
where the civilians suffered from extreme poverty and overwhelming
material needs. 18 The quest for justice based on truth and the rule of law is
a key thread of continuity that begins with the initial response and runs
throughout the stability, transformation, and sustainability phases of the
mission.
The quest for justice was enmeshed with the values of our Republic
from its earliest days. America was born as a fragile republic very much
aware of its vulnerability, yet facing the future with faith built on dedication
to the dual pillars of peace through justice and peace through strength. 9 As
President Jefferson rose to deliver his first inaugural address, America
faced a century filled with new dangers and unfolding challenges that
threatened to erode the very foundations of our liberty and collective 2peace
(in that sense not all that different from our present national milieu).2° His
16 BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM SOCRATES TO THE AGE OF
IDEOLOGY 31 (1982).
17 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 52-53 (Francis MacDonald Comford trans., Oxford
University Press 1945).
18 See Georges Anglade, Rules, Risks, and Rifts in the Transition to Democracy in Haiti,
20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1176, 1190 (1997) ("In the presence of an inhuman spectacle of
misery and its urgent material needs, one tends to forget that the primary needs of people are
liberty, justice, and security. Because a pauper also needs justice, the object of a transition to
democracy becomes the modem organization of justice in a State of law. This demands
destruction of the old military-police apparatus in order to give birth to another organization
in charge of public order. It also requires that the institutions of justice and the body of
functionaries that make them work be reconsidered so as to produce a 'just justice' and in
order to guarantee a 'free freedom.' Haiti must reconstruct judicial power separate from the
executive power, which too often has controlled judicial power. Justice by law is thus the
initial goal in the transition to democracy as well as the object of the transition itself. It is
essentially through the achievement of this goal that Haiti can unite a country broken in two,
and create a single people from two profoundly antagonistic factions. Economic analysis
also poses justice as a preliminary condition necessary to development.").
19 Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in
Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modem World, in LEGAL AND MORAL
CONSTRAINTS ON Low-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 67 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 43, 44
(Alberto R. Coil et al. eds., 1995).
20 On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a Joint Session of Congress, aware
that the world - - and perhaps the terrorist network - was listening. The President declared,
"we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to
anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to
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inaugural message articulated an enduring American vision to propel us
forward as a nation of purpose and principle in the international arena.
Summarizing the themes that would guide America through the
uncertainties of a new century, President Jefferson asserted that the
foundational American principle should be to seek "[e]qual and exact
justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political.",
21
President Jefferson portrayed a "bright constellation" composed of
nonnegotiable values that would combine to form the "creed of our political
faith" and serve as the touchstone for the future.22 He pointedly told the
nation that "should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let
us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads us to
peace, liberty, and safety., 23 After over two hundred years, the values of
justice and liberty remain the core objectives for which we strive, albeit in a
much more complicated and changed world.
In time, the pursuit of justice became the cornerstone of our domestic
legal culture because of the balance between power, law, and liberty. The
great jurist Learned Hand captured the essence of this connection when he
said that,
[t]he liberty that must lie in the hearts of men is not the ruthless,
the unbridled will, the freedom to do as one likes. That is the
denial of liberty and it leads straight to its overthrow. A society
in which men recognize no check upon their freedom, soon
our enemies, justice will be done." Available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
Secretary of State Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his first public comments made from
Lima, Peru:
A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, but.., you can be sure that
America will deal with this tragedy in a way that brings those responsible to
justice. You can be sure that as terrible a day as this is for us, we will get
through it because we are a strong nation, a nation that believes in itself."
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 10 (2002).
21 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICA 348 (William J. Bennett ed., 1997).
22 Id. Among the other principles that President Jefferson promulgated were "peace,
commerce, and honest friendship, with all nations - entangling alliances with none; the
support of state governments in all their rights, as the most competent administration for our
domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the
preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor
of our peace at home and safety abroad.., the diffusion of information and the arraignment
of all abuses at the bar of public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press; freedom
of person under the protection of the habeas corpus; and trial by juries impartially selected."
Id.
23 Id.
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becomes a society in which freedom is the possession of the
savage few.24
Learned Hand recognized that the pursuit of justice is found in the
very fabric of a society built on the rule of law rather than being dominated
by force, terror, and the personal predilections of a despot.
In the parlance of international criminal law, when the "savage few"
are able to impose their will on the rest of society without legal or moral
constraint, that is what we really mean when we decry the culture of
impunity.25  In light of this intellectual reality, the practical challenge is
what do we do about the pursuit of justice? How do we best grapple with
these problems that we have recognized since at least 1802? The
operational challenge confronting military commanders and their lawyers is
how to balance the quest for justice with the overall military and political
mission.
Lest some begin to think of these things as a mushy, starry-eyed dream
of a few idealistic lawyers and liberals who aspire just to do good
regardless of the costs, the current U.S. National Security Strategy
promulgated by the Bush Administration is on point. Seeking to achieve
the goal of justice, the Bush Administration has reshaped the machinery of
government around the changed security environment after 9/11. To that
end, the U.S. National Security Strategy focuses on attaining the goal of
justice:
In pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we
stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice
because these principles are right and true for all people
everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is
exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want
their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and
violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to
24 Learned Hand, Remarks to the "I Am an American" Day Celebration at Central Park,
New York (May 21, 1944), reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 189 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1974).
25 German forces were able to commit almost unthinkable brutalities under the shield of
Nazi sovereignty. Adolf Hitler imposed the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle) in order to
exercise his will as supreme through the police, the courts, the military, and all the other
institutions of organized German society. The oath of the Nazi party stated: "I owe
inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he
designates for me." See 2 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A
PROSECUTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1037-38 (1999). Accordingly, power resided in
Hitler, from whom subordinates derived absolute authority in hierarchical order. This
absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in all areas of public and private life
led in Justice Jackson's famous words to "a National Socialist despotism equaled only by the
dynasties of the ancient East." 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99-100 (AMS Press 1971) (1947).
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servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret
police. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute
power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal
justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and
respect for private property.26
"Justice" as a component of United States foreign policy is an
admittedly vague objective. Nevertheless, American forces become living
demonstrations of American values - Ambassadors for Freedom27 - the
moment they depart from American soil. That is the unstated role in which
American forces are cast upon deployment to Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq,
or any one of a hundred other nations. Protecting and promoting the rule of
law is a national goal that springs from the wellspring of our Constitution
and is in the very spine of American military professionalism. Though the
concept of seeking "justice" to achieve core national security goals has
been a thread of American political dialogue from the early days of our
Republic, the concrete form of that pursuit in practice retains an elusive,
often ephemeral, character. Military commanders and lawyers are on the
front lines in that effort. They are increasingly confronted with the
challenge of taking our national vision, now captured in the U.S. National
Security Strategy policy statement, and implementing it on the ground in
practical and visible ways.
In focusing on the practical aspects of actualizing justice, it is
necessary to describe three fundamental principles that will shape the
pursuit of justice in every military endeavor. Think of them as grundnorm,
the terrain, the foundation upon which all efforts to do justice will actually
be built. The three fundamental factors that always shape military efforts to
pursue justice on the ground are: (1) the reality that domestic states always
have responsibility for prosecuting their own nationals; (2) the almost
seismic tension between domestic accountability mechanisms and
internationalized mechanisms, and (3) the undercurrent caused by limited
resources between military and civilian actors in moving towards a
workable justice system.
The three abovementioned trends provide the backdrop to every
operational effort towards justice. They provide the framework within
which military practitioners operate and each will have varying effects on
the practical steps that the military may or may not take towards achieving
justice. In light of the above-listed considerations, this essay will proceed
to highlight a number of associated practical issues that are best thought of
26 THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
27 For a broader explication of this theme, see David J. Scheffer & Michael A. Newton,
Ambassadors for Freedom, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. 167 (Dec. 2000).
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as the stepping stones towards military efforts to facilitate the pursuit of
justice. After discussing some of the pragmatic issues and practical
barriers, this essay will conclude by highlighting three specific areas that
are emerging to potentially undermine the pursuit of justice in the real
world and on the ground.
The first background factor is almost so basic that it goes without
saying. Any lawyer in any domestic system in the world recognizes that a
sovereign state has not only the right, but the legal obligation, to pursue
justice for violations of domestic criminal law. The basic exercise of
punitive criminal accountability pursuant to domestic laws is at the heart of
our understanding of what it means to have a society built on the rule of
law. It is so essential and so basic that we take it for granted, and therefore
forget its implications for a military force deployed to a society where the
legislative and judicial systems have become corrupted, replaced, or have
simply collapsed under the weight of tyranny or corruption.
As a logical application of this principle, Article 146 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War specifies
that nation states have the obligation to search for persons suspected of
committing grave breaches. States have a corresponding obligation to
bring them before their own courts or to transfer them to another state for
prosecution.28 During operations, one of the most critical functions for
28 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians
Convention].
Art. 146. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering
to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in
the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of
all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave
breaches defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper
trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by
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military lawyers is to define the line between legal obligations and policy
pronouncements. 29  Lawyers advise - commanders command. Military
lawyers must advise commanders on the precise scope of their legal
obligations. 30 After meeting the obligations of the law, further efforts to
punish war criminals are made on the basis of policy decisions in
accordance with the mission statement and the intent of the superior
commander.
In the context of achieving justice, two important legal conclusions
flow from the language of Article 146. One is that the legal obligation, as a
clear provision of an international treaty, is a limited obligation applicable
only to states within their territory or in territory over which they exercise
judicial control by virtue of the law of occupation.31 Hence, NATO did not
have the affirmative legal obligation to search for war criminals in Bosnia-
Herzegovina because it is an international organization and because the
forces deployed by NATO nations entered Bosnia-Herzegovina pursuant to
international treaty and not as an occupation force. The obligation to search
for war criminals and bring them to justice extended to the nations within
the Former Yugoslavia by virtue of the Geneva Conventions, even if they
had not explicitly accepted that obligation in the GFAP.32
Some NGOs have attempted to stretch the treaty-based obligation to
pursue war criminals into extraterritorial baggage that follows deployed
military forces wherever they go and whatever the mission. However, as a
matter of law, it is simply incorrect to extrapolate from the language of the
Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.
29 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims Of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art.
82, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 41, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol 1], (requiring the
presence of legal advisors to advise commanders and conduct training in the obligations
arising from the law of armed conflict).
30 For the implementation of the current duty to provide substantive operational law
advice, see IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION (CJCSI) 5810.01B (2002) (updating earlier instructions with
similar substantive content and stating that legal advisors will provide guidance concerning
law of war compliance "at all appropriate levels of command and during all stages of
operational planning and execution ofjoint and combined operations.").
31 See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 593 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
1960) [hereinafter RED CROSS COMMENTARY] ("The obligation on the High Contracting
Parties to search for persons accused to have committed grave breaches imposes an active
duty on them. As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that there is on its territory a person
who has committed such a breach, its duty is to ensure that the person concerned is arrested
and prosecuted with all speed. The necessary police action should be taken spontaneously,
therefore, not merely in pursuance of a request from another State.").
32 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Geneva Conventions and impose binding obligations on American forces or
those of any other coalition ally anytime they deploy. The net effect of
imposing a legal obligation to search out war criminals, and the legal
obligation to prosecute them, and the legal obligation to set up tribunals and
the legal obligation to support any such efforts could be to undermine the
pursuit of justice by creating a disincentive for the very forces capable of
restoring respect for the rule of law. If forces are to deploy with the
affirmative legal duty to apprehend suspects or convene trials of war
criminals, the mission statement must be based on an affirmative source of
legal authority such as a Security Council resolution.
The second notable aspect of Article 146 as it relates to the pursuit of
justice is less visible, but no less significant. In December 1948, the ICRC
submitted a draft negotiating text for Article 146 to delegates. The ICRC
text would have required states to prosecute grave breaches before their
own courts or "any international jurisdiction, the competence of which has
been recognized by them., 33 That was rejected in the negotiations of the
Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the language and the practice of states,
and the negotiating history of Article 146 all support the conclusion that
the primary obligation to pursue justice lies in the domestic forums of the
state in which either the grave breaches were committed or in which the
suspect is present.34 This, in turn, means that international law does not
support the inference that an international forum is the only appropriate
judicial avenue simply by virtue of the nature of the violations.
Despite the primacy for domestic forums built into the law of war,
professional military forces are often confronted with circumstances in
which the enemy forces disregard applicable rules of international
humanitarian law35 without threat of sanction in their own system. U.S.
33 RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 586 ("Without prejudice to the provisions
of the foregoing Article, grave breaches of the Convention shall be punished as crimes
against the law of nations by the tribunals of any of the High Contracting Parties or by any
international jurisdiction the competence of which has been recognized by them. Grave
breaches shall include in particular those which cause death, great human suffering or
serious injury to body or health, those which constitute a grave denial of personal liberty or a
derogation from the dignity due to the person or involve extensive destruction of property,
also breaches which by reason of their nature or persistence show a deliberate disregard of
this Convention.").
34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980),.
35 This vague and not altogether satisfactory rubric is increasingly used as shorthand to
refer to the core body of the law of armed conflict as well as other norms related to the
protection of persons. The term international humanitarian law generally includes the body
of treaty norms that apply in the context of armed conflict as well as the less distinct
boundaries of internationally accepted custom. The core body of the international law of
war includes the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
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forces have an encompassing obligation to comply with the "law of war
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized.,
36
This creates a legal disparity in which military lawyers in post-conflict
settings have repeatedly grappled with the reality that the applicable
domestic law is unsettled and inadequate to provide a basis for the
restoration of justice.
37
The legal regime is not so inflexible that it would elevate the
provisions of domestic law and the structure of domestic institutions above
the pursuit of justice. Thus, despite the general rule that the criminal laws
of an adversary occupied in the aftermath of an international armed conflict
remain in force, the occupying power may repeal or suspend the existing
criminal law in circumstances when the domestic law infringes on the right
of the civilian to a fair and effective justice system.38 Furthermore, the
Geneva Conventions expressly permit the occupying power to modify
domestic institutions (which would include the judicial system and the laws
applicable thereto) when the existing institutions or government of the
occupied territory operate to deprive human beings of "the rights and
(replacing previous Geneva Wounded and Sick Conventions of 22 August 1864, 6 July
1906, and 27 July 1929 by virtue of Article 59); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (replacing Convention for the Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (replacing the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021) [hereinafter Convention on Prisoners of
War]; To a more debatable degree, later treaty texts evolved into customary international
law. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S 609, 26 I.L.M. 561. (1987) [hereinafter Protocol II],.
36 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF INSTRUCTION (CJCSI) 5810.011B (2002) (stating that United States Armed Forces
"will comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and, unless directed by competent authorities, the U.S. Armed Forces will
comply with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations."). See
also U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, DIRECTIVE 5100.77 (1998) [
hereinafter DOD Dir. 5100.77] (mandating prompt reporting of allegations of violations of
international humanitarian law, training of military forces in that body of law, and the
provision of "qualified legal advisors").
37 See generally F.M. Lorenz, Law and Anarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-
94, at 27 (describing the conditions faced by United States forces deployed to Somalia). For
a description of the conditions in Panama prior to the United States invasion in December
1989, see John E. Parkerson, United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting
Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 Mit. L. REv. 31 (1991).
38 Civilians Convention, supra note 28, art. 64.
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safeguards provided for them" under the Fourth Geneva Convention.39
Military lawyers and commanders will be the eye in the storm of efforts to
reinvigorate a functional justice system in a setting governed by the law of
occupation.
Attempting to apply the spirit of these norms in a non-occupation
setting, the military on the ground will work with other international
organizations. For example, the Senior Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) in Kosovo (who also served as the head of UNMIK, the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo), used his Chapter VII authority40 to
promulgate a regulation that preserved the domestic law in place at the time
NATO entered Kosovo.4 1 However, the existing criminal code had served
as the vehicle for repression of the Albanian community. As a result, the
predominately Albanian judges appointed to the Emergency Judicial
System in Kosovo were adamant in their insistence that the applicable law
was the Kosovo Criminal Code which had been superceded by the Serbs
along with the revocation of Kosovo autonomy in 1989. This legal standoff
left military attorneys and commanders (as well as international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, UNMIK officials, and
international police) with conflicting undercurrents of law and a legal void
that brought uncertainty and instability despite the military presence.42
Military forces were also hampered by the practical problem that English
language copies of either criminal code were unavailable.
39 RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 31, at 274 (explaining the intended
implementation of the language of Article 47, Civilians Convention, supra note 28, art. 47
("any change introduced" to domestic institutions by the occupying power must protect the
rights of the civilian population)).
40 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 Ith mtg. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
41 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 1999/1 (Aug.
12, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 1999/1], available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/1999/regO1-99.htm (Section 3 states: "The laws applicable in the territory of
Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not
conflict with standards referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the mandate given to
UNMIK under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), or the present or
any other regulation issued by UNMIK.").
42 For a detailed description of this problem, see ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE), LEGAL SYSTEMS MONITORING SECTION (LSMS), Kosovo:
REvIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 1 SEPTEMBER 2000-28 FEBRUARY 2001 12
[hereinafter LSMS REPORT], available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/
reports/justice/criminaljustice2.pdf; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A FRAGILE
PEACE: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR JUSTICE IN Kosovo § II.A. (1999) [hereinafter
FRAGILE PEACE], available at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/kosovofull 1099.htm.
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The SRSG formally addressed the gap on December 12, 1999 when he
promulgated UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 to clarify the applicable law.43
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 was nevertheless not a complete solution
because its exceptions allow application of the post-1989 law when it "is
not discriminatory" and either fills a gap in the 1989 law44 or provides more
rights to a criminal defendant.4 5 Finally, the UNMIK Regulation requires
that the criminal laws be implemented by domestic judges in compliance
with a range of human rights instruments 6 that have only recently become
available in the Albanian language for use by domestic judges. This legal
milieu meant that military attorneys faced building pressure from a restless
population that desired to see the rule of law in practice sooner rather than
later. The legal indecision also meant that persons detained by KFOR (the
NATO command in Kosovo deployed under the authority of Security
Council Resolution 1244) based on force protection requirements were
detained for significant periods of time pending clarification of the
applicable domestic law and the establishment of suitable forums.
The second major contextual factor derives from the previously
discussed principle that domestic criminal justice systems should normally
exercise jurisdiction for serious crimes. In situations where there is an
internationalized judicial mechanism capable of exercising jurisdiction,
there is an increasing tendency to view international institutions as a
panacea for addressing those violations. As noted above, truth-based
justice and an established system for administering justice are the
foundation for lasting peace within a society.
Deployed military forces are increasingly confronted with the
necessity of navigating through the conflicting interests between the long
43 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 1999/24, at § 1.1 (Dec. 12, 1999),
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm. This law
provides:
The law applicable in Kosovo shall be: (a) The regulations promulgated by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued
thereunder; and (b) The law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989.
In case of a conflict, the regulations and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder
shall take precedence.
44 Id. at § 1.2 ("If a court of competent jurisdiction or a body or person required to
implement a provision of the law, determines that a subject matter or situation is not covered
by the laws set out in section 1 of the present regulation but is covered by another law in
force in Kosovo after 22 March 1989 which is not discriminatory and which complies with
section 3 of the present regulation, the court, body or person shall, as an exception, apply
that law.").
45 Id. at § 1.4 ("In criminal proceedings, the defendant shall have the benefit of the most
favourable provision in the criminal laws which were in force in Kosovo between 22 March
1989 and the date of the present regulation.").
46 Id. at §1.3 (mandating compliance with a range of aspirational human rights
instruments as well as binding European conventions).
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term stability of the state, the short term need to establish accountability
mechanisms, and the urgent desire of the population to see justice done for
the crimes which often devastated their lives. This balancing act, in turn,
requires military forces to decide about the best allocation of their limited
resources. Commanders must sort through options ranging from an
internationalized judicial process, vigorous support to the revitalized
domestic process, garnering international judges, court administrators and
lawyers to assist domestic efforts, development of a hybrid model, or a
combination of the options.
In making these decisions, there is no easy answer. The advisability
and feasibility of various judicial forums involve estimations of the political
will of nations contributing forces, the capacity of the local judiciary, the
local legal culture, the necessity for international mechanisms, and the
nature of the crimes committed. Military forces today deploy to a changed
legal landscape because of the striking development of a distinct discipline
termed international criminal law and the parallel evolution of international
forums to adjudicate crimes.4 7 Some states and scholars questioned the
development of this dynamic field because of the implication that
internationalized judicial processes would erode the right of sovereign
states to prosecute serious violations of international law. The very phrase
"international criminal law" sparked diplomatic debate based on an
underlying tension between the international respect for sovereign justice
systems and the transcendent importance of truth and accountability. 4 In
47 The field of "international criminal law" is an ambiguous concept with indistinct
boundaries. Because no single class of crimes or isolated body of law forms an accurate and
complete foundation for the currently existing tribunals created at the international level to
punish individuals for violations of international law, one distinguished scholar and diplomat
has proposed the unifying concept of "atrocity crimes." David J. Scheffer, The Future of
Atrocity Law, SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 389, 398 (2002).
48 For a description of this analytical difficulty encountered and eventually overcome by
delegates negotiating the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court, see
Michael A. Newton, International Criminal Law Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM, 79 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD.
325, 336-345 (Paul Wilson and Frederic Borch eds., 2003). See, e.g., Leslie C. Green, Is
There an International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA L. REV. 251 (1983). The current United
States policy is focused on encouraging states to exercise their sovereign rights to pursue
accountability for war crimes and other egregious violations of international and domestic
law. The United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes has publicly stated that:
"the international practice should be to support sovereign states seeking justice domestically
when it is feasible and would be credible .... International tribunals are not and should not
be the courts of first redress, but of last resort. When domestic justice is not possible for
egregious war crimes due to a failed state or a dysfunctional judicial system, the
international community may through the Security Council or by consent, step in on an ad
hoc basis as it did in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia."
Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 138-39 (2001)
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practice, internationalized mechanisms have been created only as a
necessary fallback when domestic forums were unable to enforce the
transcendent norms of international law.
Though internationalized judicial mechanisms have permanently
altered the face of international law,49 the principle that sovereign states
retain primary responsibility for adjudicating violations of international
humanitarian law is a cornerstone principle of the edifice of
internationalized justice. For example, in responding to the "blackest crimes
of all history,"5  the Moscow Declaration made the apprehension and
punishment of German criminals a major objective of the war as early as
October 30, 1943.51 It is important to note that the Moscow Declaration
specifically favored punishment through the national courts in the countries
where the crimes were committed.5 2 The military commissions established
in the Far East similarly incorporated the principle that the international
forum did not supplant domestic mechanisms.53
(statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes
Issues).
49 See generally PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE ?: WAR
CRIIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2002).
50 Press Release, White House, Statement by the President (Mar. 24, 1944), reprinted in
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 12 (1945) [hereinafter Jackson
Report] (quoting President Roosevelt's description of Nazi atrocities).
51 9 Department of State Bulletin 310 (1943), reprinted in Jackson Report, supra note 50,
at 11 [hereinafter Moscow Declaration]. The Moscow Declaration was actually issued to the
Press on November 1, 1943. Jackson Report, supra note 50, at 11 n. 1. For an account of the
political and legal maneuvering behind the effort to bring this stated war aim into actuality,
see PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 85-110 (2000).
52 The Declaration specifically stated that German criminals were to be "sent back to the
countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and
punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments
which will be erected therein." Moscow Declaration, supra note 51, reprinted in Jackson
Report, supra note 50, at 11. The international forum was limited only to those offenses
where a single country had no greater grounds for claiming jurisdiction than another country.
Justice Jackson recognized this reality in his famous opening statement. He accepted the
fact that the International Military Tribunal was merely a necessary alternative to domestic
courts for prosecuting the "symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism." 2 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99 (AMS Press
1971) (1947). He further clarified that any defendants who succeeded in "escaping the
condemnation of this Tribunal... will be delivered up to our continental Allies." Id. at 102.
53 See Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals, General Headquarters, United
States Army Pacific, AG 000.5, Sept. 24, 1945, para. 5(b) ("[p]ersons whose offenses have a
particular geographical location outside Japan may be returned to the scene of their crimes
for trial by competent military or civil tribunals of the local jurisdiction.") (on file with
author).
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Following the legacy of Nuremberg by nearly fifty years, the current
ad hoc tribunals were both created in contexts where justice would not be
achieved or even pursued in domestic forums. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was created to fill the domestic
enforcement void caused by the dictatorial control that the Milosevic
regime exercised over the Yugoslav judicial system.54 Similarly, in the
context of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council created the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) where there would
have otherwise been a prosecutorial void due to the total disarray of the
domestic judicial system.55 Against this backdrop of international law and
practice, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
56
implicitly concedes that states will remain responsible for prosecuting the
vast majority of offenses even in a mature ICC regime.
The drafters in Rome recognized the reality that the ICC will have
limited resources and political capital. The Rome Statute accordingly
incorporated a number of subjective thresholds designed to ensure that
domestic forums will continue to adjudicate the vast majority of cases,
while the ICC itself focuses on a smaller number of more severe or difficult
57prosecutions.
Despite the rebirth of international mechanisms as a viable alternative,
history shows that the overwhelming number of prosecutions for violations
of international humanitarian law and other serious crimes have come in
national forums as opposed to international tribunals. In contrast to the
original twenty-four defendants charged before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, 58 Allied zone of occupation courts, exercising
54 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993);
see also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 26, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). The "particular
circumstances" of the impunity in the Former Yugoslavia warranted the creation of the
international tribunal.
" S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); see
generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
FOR RWANDA (1998).
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 12-19, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
57 Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 20, 37 (2001);
see Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 429-430
(1998) (discussing the initial proposal for a threshold requirement).
58 Of the original twenty-four accused, one committed suicide before trial, one was tried
in absentia, and one had charges dismissed by the court due to mental incapacity to stand
trial. The Tribunal handed down twelve death sentences, seven prison terms, and three
acquittals (all of whom were later convicted in German domestic courts). M. CHERIF
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sovereign power on German soil, sentenced over five thousand Germans for
war crimes. 59  Similarly, from 1946 to 1948, Australian, American,
Filipino, Dutch, British, French, Chinese, and Australian courts convicted
some 4,200 war criminals in the Pacific theater.60  Based on the clear
textual tenet of complementarity, 61 even the most ardent advocates of the
ICC concede that the very best world is one in which the ICC is useless and
irrelevant. Why? Because crimes are being handled in a timely fashion in
the country where people see justice being done. That's where the physical
evidence is located and where the victims live. That's where justice can be
achieved in the most expeditious manner which also does the most to
restore long term societal stability.
The policy choice among alternative judicial forums is not simply an
intellectual, esoteric exercise for deployed military commanders. They
must confront a restless population that demands justice. Military Civil
Affairs Teams are the ones who must explain to local officials the delays
inherent in actualizing justice at the domestic level, and conversely help
explain the reasoning behind the substitution of international forums for
domestic efforts. In some circumstances, the presence of viable
international forums can also create false expectations among the civilian
population.
For example, the Security Council repeatedly affirmed ICTY
jurisdiction in an ongoing effort to prevent abuses by the Milosevic regime
inside Kosovo. The Security Council expressly ordered the Belgrade
regime to cooperate with the investigative efforts of tribunal personnel,
62
and directed the Office of the Prosecutor to "begin gathering information
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANE T IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 528 n.91, 529
(2d ed. 1999).
59 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, 11 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 947-56 (1968). The United
States convicted 1814 (with 450 executions); the French convicted 2107 (109 executed); the
British convicted 1085 (240 executed); there are no reliable numbers for the thousands
executed by the Russians. Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 532. See generally M. Cherif
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 20-21 (1997)
(describing the failures of the Allies to prosecute alleged war criminals at the conclusion of
World War I).
60 WHITEMAN, supra note 59, at 1005; Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 36 n.14 (citing R. John
Pritchard, The Quality of Mercy: Appellant Procedures, the Confirmation and Reduction of
Sentences and the Exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Clemency towards Convicted War
Criminals, in 8 BRITISH WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN THE FAR EAST, 1946-48 (R. John Pritchard
ed., 21 vols.) (documenting 2248 trials, involving 5596 accused, which resulted in 4654
convictions).
61 See Rome Statute, supra note 56, arts. 17, 19(1), 19(2), 20(3).
62 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3868th mtg. 17, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1 160 (1998).
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related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction., 63
Despite the clear warnings of the international community, and express
jurisdiction of a functioning international tribunal, Belgrade's forces
expelled over 1.5 million Albanians from their homes, committed
uncounted rapes, pillaged whole communities, destroyed tens of thousands
of civilian homes in at least 1,200 communities, and murdered what was
estimated at the time to be up to 10,000 Kosovar civilians.64
After NATO forces entered Kosovo under the authority of Resolution
1244, Albanian judges attending the first judicial training institute held in
Pristina were dismayed to discover that the ICTY would not assume
responsibility for prosecuting all of the war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by Serbian military and paramilitary forces. The
judges, along with much of the Albanian population, assumed that the
ICTY was prepared to fill the judicial void left by the demolition of the
local system by the Serbs. Supported by representatives sent from The
Hague, military lawyers from both the United Kingdom 65 and the United
States66 explained that the ICTY would focus on a small number of the
most culpable within the killing machines that committed the atrocities
leaving the balance to the reconstituted Kosovar judiciary. The capacity
deficit of the ICTY meant that the road to justice using the rebuilt domestic
system would be longer and more difficult, but ultimately more conducive
to long term societal stability and the respect for the rule of law.
67
63 id.
64 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN Kosovo: AN ACCOUNTING 3 (1999); The
Great Exodus, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24-30, 1999, at 48; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Kosovo/KOSOVA As SEEN, As TOLD: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS FINDINGS OF THE OSCE Kosovo VERIFICATION MISSION OCTOBER 1998 TO
JUNE 1999 (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part I / (last
visited Feb. 5, 2004).
65 LTC Richard Batty, Senior Legal Advisor, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).
66 MAJ Michael A. Newton, serving at the time as the Military Advisor to the United
States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues.
67 This policy perspective is at the heart of the political decision that the Bush
Administration made after more than a year of deliberation with regard to the U.S. policy
towards the International Criminal Court. Under Secretary Marc Grossman, American
Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC (May 6, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. ICC policy],
available at http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm. Under Secretary Grossman summarized the
U.S. philosophical decision as follows:
While we oppose the ICC we share a common goal with its supporters - the
promotion of the rule of law. Our differences are in approach and philosophy. In
order for the rule of law to have true meaning, societies must accept their
responsibilities and be able to direct their future and come to terms with their past.
An unchecked international body should not be able to interfere in this delicate
process. For example: When a society makes the transition from oppression to
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Military commanders and their lawyers must also grapple with a
series of pragmatic problems that flow from the strategic/political decisions
about which basket should hold the proverbial prosecutorial eggs. As noted
above, military efforts flow from a clear articulation of the mission. The
process of analyzing the mission, developing courses of action, and honing
a military plan rests on the fulcrum of properly describing the specified
requirements in the mission statement.68 After delineating the specified
tasks, lawyers and planners will incorporate the tasks that are necessarily
implied into the overall mission statement, and allocate resources against
the entire range of functions. In fact, U.S. forces are prohibited from
spending resources for things outside their authorized duties, hence the
inclusion of justice 6as a component of the mission is a necessary predicate
for military efforts. 9 The profile of the justice component within the larger
democracy, their new government must face their collective past. The state
should be allowed to choose the method. The government should decide whether
to prosecute or seek national reconciliation. This decision should not be made by
the ICC. If the state chooses as a result of a democratic and legal process not to
prosecute fully, and instead to grant conditional amnesty, as was done in difficult
case of South Africa, this democratic decision should be respected. Whenever a
state accepts the challenges and responsibilities associated with enforcing the rule
of law, the rule of law is strengthened and a barrier to impunity is erected. It is
this barrier that will create the lasting goals the ICC seeks to attain. This
responsibility should not be taken away from states. International practice should
promote domestic accountability and encourage sovereign states to seek
reconciliation where feasible. The existence of credible domestic legal systems is
vital to ensuring conditions do not deteriorate to the point that the international
community is required to intercede. In situations where violations are grave and
the political will of the sovereign state is weak, we should work, using any
influence we have, to strengthen that will. In situations where violations are so
grave as to amount to a breach of international peace and security, and the
political will to address these violations is non-existent, the international
community may, and if necessary should, intercede through the UN Security
Council as we did in Bosnia and Rwanda. Unfortunately, the current framework
of the Rome treaty threatens these basic principles.
Id.
68 This principle is at the heart of the military planning doctrine embodied in a range of
Joint Publications. See INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 488 (William O'Brien ed.,
2003) (Chapter 27 provides an excellent summary of this complex process), available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETIntemet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003).
69 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000) ( "Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for
which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law."). This provision
is enforced through the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
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mission then drives the commander's decisions about the prioritization of
resources. For example, an infantry company that is guarding a mass grave,
is not patrolling and performing other duties. An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
tasked to look for groups of civilian victims of the crimes against humanity,
is not out seeking enemy equipment or personnel.
In Bosnia, the opaque verbiage of Annex 1 A70 of the GFAP regarding
military support to efforts to seek justice left a gap in the mission planning
that commanders later filled through the Rules of Engagement and through
legal opinions disseminated through command channels. The result was
mixed guidance that allowed only limited military support to ICTY
investigative teams such as life support, emergency assistance, helicopter
reconnaissance, and overall security considerations.71  Within the
constraints of the NATO mission in Bosnia, subordinate units could not
provide guards for ICTY investigators, direct escorts for teams,
investigation of mass graves, or witness protection.72
In contrast, Resolution 1244 included a specific paragraph mandating
"full cooperation by all concerned, including the international securiy
presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. '
The military supported ICTY investigative teams in almost every way
based on this clear mission. KFOR compiled a detailed database of over
150 crime scenes, together with available witness statements and digital
photos that was forwarded to the Tribunal. ICTY investigative teams were
nestled within the command structure in each of the sector headquarters.74
Military teams secured mass graves, protected the ICTY teams when
needed, escorted them back and forth as they did the forensics work at the
sites identified in the Milosevic indictment, and executed a myriad of other
support functions. The difference was that the justice component of the
mission was clear, and NATO had clear legal authority to support the
Tribunal (which included apprehension of suspects).
The clear mandate of Resolution 1244 masked some larger legal
difficulties that U.S. forces will confront in order to assist a court
established under the auspices of the United Nations. From the perspective
of Charter legal authority, the ICTY and ICTR are best understood as
enforcement measures of a judicial nature. The circumstances of the
conflicts forced the Security Council to assume a quasi-sovereign role by
70 GFAP, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
71 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, UNITED STATES ARMY, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS 1995-
1998: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 125 (1998).
72 Id.
73 S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40, 14.
74 Each sector in Kosovo was under the overall command of one national headquarters.
The five sectors correspond to the German, French, Italian, British, and American
headquarters.
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creating judicial structures within the territorial bounds that would
otherwise have been policed by responsible governmental structures.
75
Nations are legally obligated to accept the decisions of the Security
Council. 76 Hence, the use of Chapter VII authority in this manner was both
unprecedented and ingenious because the international tribunals were
grounded on a Security Council determination that judicial accountability
for crimes would facilitate the maintenance and restoration of international
peace and security.77
Despite the force of these obligations, United States law presents two
key barriers to military efforts aimed at supporting any international forum
created under the authority of the UN. In the first place, unless Congress
appropriates particular funds to the Department of Defense to support an
international tribunal, such support can only be made based on specific
statutory authority. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. military
provided some assistance to UN efforts at building the Haitian judiciary
under the authority of section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act. 8 Based
on a presidential determination, the Secretary of Defense may permit U.S.
military personnel to "render any technical, scientific, or professional
advice or service" to an international organization. 79  This authority is
limited to peacekeeping operations, and is available only up to the amounts
appropriated by Congress each year. This authority has been used to
provide military expertise in support of the "justice mission." In Haiti, U.S.
military teams assisted with the UN Mission by assessing the domestic
justice system and offering suggestions for improvements. 80  Similarly
subject to congressional appropriations each fiscal year, the President is
authorized to provide support to "friendly countries and international
organizations" for programs carried out "in furtherance of the national
security interests of the United States. 81
Two other key provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act are especially
important sources of authority for military support to justice mechanisms
even in the absence of specific appropriations. One provision permits the
"drawdown of defense articles", "defense services" or "military education
and training" based on an "unforeseen emergency . . . which requires
75 See U.N. CHARTER art. 29; see also Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the
Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994).
76 U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
77 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 18-30, U.N. Doe. S/25704 (1993).
78 22 U.S.C. § 2388 (2000).
79 id.
80 See Justice Team III Report: Republic of Haiti, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, U.S. Army
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (Dec. 12,
1995) (copy on file with author).
81 22 U.S.C. § 2348 (2000).
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immediate military assistance to a foreign country or international
organization., 82 Assuming that the relevant Department of Justice agencies
were insufficient, this broad provision could be used to provide military
support for efforts to revive domestic justice systems or to support UN
efforts. However, Section 552(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act is the most
foreseeable tool for providing support to justice mechanisms. The
President has statutory authority to "direct th drawdown" of goods and
services from the Department of Defense based on a determination and
report to Congress that there are insufficient appropriated funds to respond
to "an unforeseen emergency" and that such assistance is "important to the
national interests of the United States. 83
Beginning in the 1994, Congress anticipated the use of section 552 as
authority for draw downs of goods and professional services (to include
military expertise) used to buttress mechanisms designed to establish
accountability for genocide or other violations of international humanitarian
law. This was the authority used to provide both military and Department
of Justice attorneys to the ICTY in its infancy. Each subsequent year, the
President has had specific authority to direct drawdowns in support of the
ICTY or "such other tribunals or commissions as the [Security] Council
may establish or authorize. ,84 In addition to the established ad hoc
tribunals, Congress has specifically admonished that this authority extends
to U.S. support for the Special Court in Sierra Leone.85
The provision of evidence to war crimes tribunals provides another
major set of legal challenges. In post-conflict areas, the entire country can
be seen as one huge crime scene.86 Military forces entering the area are
uniquely situated to preserve evidence, begin forensics work at mass
graves, and generate other highly probative evidence. The fact that the
ICTY has over six million documents in its database shows that the
collection of evidence can be a massive job. In addition, war crimes trials
in particular are extremely complex and evidence intensive. Prosecutors at
82 22 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1) (2000).
83 22 U.S.C. § 2348a(c) (2000).
84 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 544, 117 Stat.
11,198 (2003).
85 S. REP. No. 107-219, at 33 (2002) ("The Committee continues to strongly support the
war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. The Committee expects the
administration to ensure that the tribunals have sufficient budgets, staff, and equipment, and
provides $30,000,000 in drawdown authority for war crimes tribunals established or
authorized by the U.N. Security Council with U.S. support, including the tribunal in Sierra
Leone. The Committee also urges the administration, where appropriate, to support
commissions or judicial bodies that complement the activities of these tribunals. The
Committee notes that drawdowns made under this section are unrelated to the establishment
of an international criminal court.").
86 Sebastian Junger, The Forensics of War, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 1999, at 138.
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Nuremberg reviewed over 100,000 captured German documents, millions
of feet of captured film, over 25,000 photographs prior to conducting a trial
that consumed 216 days and produced a record of over 17,000 pages." The
Dachau trial required 170 witnesses and almost 2,000 exhibits."
By doctrine, U.S. military forces must collect evidence of known or
suspected war crimes and preserve such evidence "pending turnover to
U.S., allied, or other appropriate authorities. 89 However, the military
commander may be required to resolve conflicting demands for the
available information. On the one hand, information obtained by military
forces is generally processed for its intelligence value. The military does
not routinely examine information or documents with an eye towards their
probative value at trial. Once information is processed into military
channels, it is legally equivalent to intelligence and is property of the
government that obtained it. The prosecutors scrambling to build cases also
need access to relevant information as quickly as possible, and the local
population will be most impatient to exhume mass graves and identify the
possible remains of family member or friends. NGOs are often demanding
access to particular pieces of evidence as well. The commander and
military attorney are in the eye of the storm and must decide the most
optimal destination for information in military custody. Moreover, those
decisions are often made under time pressure, with little or no guidance. In
Kosovo, for example, KFOR permitted the ICTY to fill a truck with
documents from the police station in Pristina, which allowed the Tribunal to
process the documents in its possession for possible use at trial without
further coordination with national governments.
At the other extreme, information in U.S. intelligence channels is
subject to strict rules regarding its releasability and rigid procedures for its
transfer. A basic provision of the National Security Act mandates that no
information can be released to "any organization affiliated with the United
Nations" or any affiliated "officials or employees" without a presidential
certification that procedures to protect U.S. sources and methods are in
place. 90 The United States has provided thousands of documents and other
pieces of evidence to both the ICTY and ICTR. Such evidence has been
provided using stringent procedures to account for documents and institute
safeguards against the possible unauthorized release of intelligence
information. The Rules of Procedure for the International Tribunals include
specific provisions that allow the providing government to prevent public
release without its consent.91 This principle is also an important feature of
87 Jackson Report, supra note 50, at 432-33.
88 JOSHUA M. GREENE, JUSTICE AT DACHAU 36 (2003).
89 DOD Dir. 5100.77, supra note 36, at para. 4.4.
90 50 U.S.C. § 404g(a) (2000).
9' Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Rule 70, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.28 (2003), available at
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the Rome Statute.92 Beyond the categorical imperative that commanders
cannot simply hand over information to UN sponsored forums, there is no
easy solution to the "right" option in the realm of evidence collection and
sharing. In this, as in other aspects of support for efforts at achieving
justice, the military must rely on the judgment and discretion of soldiers
and commanders in the field.
Finally, efforts to create a functioning judicial system in Kosovo
illustrate the third of the recurring background factors faced by military
forces on the ground. Both military and civilian actors are constrained by
resource limitations in moving towards a workable justice system. Simply
put, there is often a gap between the ideal transition from military to
civilian efforts in post-conflict settings and the actual transition in fact. The
military deploys with the primary task of accomplishing its mission by
ending hostilities and establishing a secure environment for the delivery of
humanitarian relief. Military forces, NGOs, and the relevant United
Nations humanitarian agencies 93 work hand in hand to achieve the cessation
of hostilities accompanied by the most effective alleviation of the human
suffering inevitably caused by the conflict. As a typical example, the first
humanitarian convoy entered Kosovo within hours of the time that KFOR
secured the key route from the border at Blace to the city of Pristina. In
Kosovo, as in many other post-conflict settings, the international
community and organizations faced a staggering array of tasks as they
began the slow process of building civil society and democratic
institutions.
94
Military commanders realize that the necessities of conflict may
prevent international organizations and United Nations agencies from being
positioned to contribute during the initial stages of the international
response. Though this role was explicit in Resolution 1244 regarding
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev28.htm (providing in pertinent part, "If the
Prosecutor is in possession of information which has been provided to the Prosecutor on a
confidential basis and which has been used solely for the purpose of generating new
evidence, that initial information and its origin shall not be disclosed by the Prosecutor
without the consent of the person or entity providing the initial information and shall in any
event not be given in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused.").
92 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 72. Some delegations expressed the view that the
provisions for protecting their national intelligence information were critically important for
their government. Michael A. Newton, The International Criminal Court Preparatory
Commission: The Way It Is & The Way Ahead, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 204, 212 (2000).
93 These generally include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), UNICEF, the World Health Organization
(WHO) as well as other groups such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
94 See generally CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES & ASSOCIATION OF
THE UNITED STATES ARMY, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TASK FRAMEWORK (May
2002) (copy on file with author).
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NATO operations in Kosovo,9 5 military forces will often be responsible by
default for public security during the initial phases. They nevertheless
assume that role with the expectation that the civil administration and
international community will field a properly trained police force as
promptly as possible to assume the law enforcement functions. Therefore,
planners hope for a smooth transition in which revitalized domestic
institutions, civilian organizations, international organizations, and NGOs
gradually assume increased responsibility for transforming society and
rebuilding institutions. In theory, this would permit a gradual decrease in





In practice, it is exceedingly difficult for a newly formed civilian
administration to move into a war-tom nation, begin operations, and reach
agreement with the relevant international organizations on an integrated
framework based on a clear understanding of their diverse roles and
responsibilities. In the wake of hostilities, military forces will often be
required to sustain their efforts well into the transformation period as the
civil structures work to achieve an integrated and effective effort. In
contrast to the ideal vision, this results in a model more akin to that shown
in figure 2.
9' S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 40, 9(d) (specifically describing the KFOR task of
"ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence [could] take
responsibility for this task.").
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Even when the pursuit of justice is a focal point of concern, and a
specific component of the mission, civilian agencies lack a dedicated
planning cadre and a "surge capacity" to concentrate resources quickly.96
As early as July 1999, the SRSG identified the "urgent need to build
genuine rule of law in Kosovo, including through the immediate re-
establishment of an independent, impartial and multi-ethnic judiciary."
97
The goal of a multi-ethnic system of justice required a complete overhaul of
existing civil and criminal codes, recruitment of judges and lawyers, and
extensive legal training. UNMIK began to plan an integrated effort in
which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
took the lead role in matters relating to the establishment of institution
building and human rights. This lead role was augmented by the UNMIK
Judicial Affairs Office,98 European Union representatives, and an array of
private NGOs with expertise in transitional justice.
The consortium of agencies and talents faced the daunting task of
jumpstarting the domestic judiciary using available Albanian legal talent.
Serbian judges refused to participate in the Emergency Judicial System
established to review pre-trial detentions made by KFOR in the interests of
96 INTERAGENCY AND POLITICAL-MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS: HAITI - A
CASE STUDY, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 53 (Margaret Daly Hayes & Gary F.
Wheatley eds., 1996); see also RICHARD H. SHULTZ, JR., IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR: US
SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND NATION-BUILDING IN PANAMA FOLLOWING JUST CAUSE
49 (1993) (noting that ICITAP was "not really geared up" and lacked the personnel to move
into Panama quickly).
97 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo, 66, U.N. Doc. S/1999/799 (1999).
98 This office had four major areas of responsibility: "the administration of courts,
prosecution services and prisons; the development of legal policies"; the review and drafting
of legislation related to the goals and purposes of UNMIK; and "the assessment of the
quality of justice in Kosovo." Id. 67.
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force protection. Of the 756 judges and prosecutors in Kosovo, only 30
Albanians remained at the time NATO entered Kosovo.99 One of the
Albanian judges who yielded to the repeated UNMIK requests that he
participate in the effort to resuscitate the judiciary was murdered on his
doorstep by unknown gunmen the following morning.
In this climate of simmering ethnic hostility, KFOR was forced to
continue to hold detained persons for long periods of time pending trial in a
reconstituted domestic judiciary. The civilian population watched uneasily
for months as no suspect faced trial for the war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in Kosovo. Almost a year after its creation, UNMIK
nearly completed plans to augment the emerging domestic judiciary with an
extraordinary court comprised of international judges and prosecutors
working alongside local officials. Commonly termed the Kosovo War and
Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC), 00 the proposal was ultimately stillborn
because of resistance to the idea of a combined judiciary, concerns that
such a special court would divert staff and resources from the local systems,
and fears that the KWECC would only serve to heighten ethnic tensions.
These delays in building institutional capacity forced KFOR to prevent a
law enforcement/punishment void by sustaining its "temporary" efforts to
fill the law and order gap for over a year.
10
General Douglas MacArthur famously noted that "[i]n war there can
be no substitute for victory."'10 2  For deployed military forces, the essence
of professionalism is to accomplish the mission while dealing in uncertain
environments, against an uncertain enemy, with limited resources and a
mission that is constantly changing. The post-conflict pursuit of justice
requires military forces to operate in a multidimensional environment filled
with multinational players and a complex combination of organizations and
individuals, each of whom has different aims and agenda, but whose
collective efforts are required to build a sustainable system of justice. One
senior U.S. officer described stability efforts in Bosnia as "Ph.D.
warfare."
0 3
9 9 See id. 66.
10o Officially styled the Court for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Crimes -Committed on
Political, Ethnic, or Religious Grounds. See UNMIK/REG/2000/XX (unpublished draft on
file with author).
101 KFOR built on the lessons learned when United States forces were operating in Haiti
after the fall of the Cedras regime. See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 1994-1995:
LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 63-64 (1995).
102 Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Joseph Martin, Jr. (Apr. 6, 1951), quoted in
ROBERT DEBS HEINL, JR., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS 338 (1966).
103 Howard Olsen & John Davis, Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations:
Lessons from Bosnia, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Oct. 29, 1999, at 3.
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Despite its difficulty, the justice component is a recurring feature in
military operations. In the future, the military needs to ensure that the right
mix of legal talent, translation skills, forensics expertise, and investigative
capacity is frontloaded as far as possible in the deployment cycle. Military
planners must allocate the right mix of resources in the right sequence to
get them in to accomplish their mission.' °4 For an armed conflict, the right
resources are infantrymen, mortars and artillery. The package of resources
-focused on the justice mission should be well trained and ready to
contribute to a lasting and just peace. If achieving justice is to be anything
more than an aspiration, that team should be among the first personnel to
enter the area of operations.
Secondly, the pursuit of justice is not a media tool to be manipulated
and sensationalized. Over time, such efforts delegitimize the process and
hence undermine the fundamental goal of restoring respect for the rule of
law. There is a very real danger that the media can be manipulated and
used to mask genuine progress with spurious allegations and
misrepresentations of the actual state of the law. This feeds into an
undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that could erode the very
foundations of the quest for the rule of law. False perceptions created by
the media can lead to a cycle of cynicism and second guessing that could
weaken the commitment of the judges and lawyers who carry the burden of
implementing the rule of law on a daily basis.
In closing, a word of caution is appropriate. When seeking justice, the
only certainty is that the effort will be difficult and proceed slower than
some observers would hope, and ultimately will produce an imperfect result
by some standards. Neither the military nor civilian agencies have sleek
teams of lawyers and preloaded equipment vans and energetic investigators
idly waiting for the chance to deploy and work for justice in a post-conflict
environment. This reality does not make the effort any less vital.
For the future, the logical corollary to General MacArthur's dictum is
that in peace, there is no substitute for justice. As the world proceeds
towards a future in which justice is more certain and devoid of political
104 In the language of U.S. Joint Doctrine, this process is known as the Time Phased Force
and Deployment Data (TPFDD). "Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is the
list of units and sustainment requirements needed to execute the operation plan (OPLAN). It
phases them into the theater of operations at the times and places required to support the
concept of operations. Its development and refinement are critical to achieving executable
OPLANs and to developing executable operation orders when using an approved TPFDD in
crisis action planning. US Transportation Command uses TPFDD to analyze the flow of
forces and cargo from their points of origin to arrival in theater. They distribute the
apportioned strategic
transportation resources. During this process, Commander in Chief, US Transportation
Command follows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance and coordinates all
major decisions with the supported combatant commander." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT
DOCTRINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 703 (1997).
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posturing, there may be a tendency in some quarters to simply accept that
the rule of law is just too hard to achieve in practice. Succumbing to such
cynicism would be to concede the battlefield to the forces of lawlessness
and chaos. We cannot succumb to such defeatism.

